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Abstract 
Previous studies show mixed evidence of the role of banking expertise on the board of directors on accounting 
conservatism. In this paper, we add to this growing literature by providing an innovative way to measure banking 
expertise based on life-time working history in banks of all individual directors on the board. We find that 
accounting conservatism is negatively affected by banking expertise on the board. Also, the results indicate that 
banking expertise on the board has a more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high 
bankruptcy risk and when firms have high financial leverage. The evidence has some implications for boards of 
directors. 
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1 Introduction  
Accounting conservatism is one of the major debt contracting mechanisms (Basu 1997; Mora and Walker 2015; 
Ruch and Taylor 2015; Watts 2003). Accounting conservatism results in lower book values relative to economic 
(or neutral) values of net assets due to lower verification requirements for the recognition of losses relative to 
gains (Mora and Walker 2015). Therefore, it facilitates the violation of debt covenants, which usually are based 
on accounting numbers, so that debtholders may take proactive actions, such as debt renegotiation or 
restructuring, to protect their interests (Ahmed et al. 2002; Nikolaev 2010; Watts 2003). Hence, it is in the 
debtholders’ main interest to demand accounting conservatism. 
Recently, previous studies indicate that the demand for accounting conservatism is affected by the 
presence of a banker on the board of directors, but the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Erkens et al. (2014) 
show that executives of lending banks serving on boards of directors of borrowing firms (affiliated bankers) can 
act as a private channel to provide lending banks with the creditworthiness of borrowing firms, leading to a 
decline in accounting conservatism. Thus, affiliated bankers help borrowing firms avoid costs associated with 
accounting conservatism (e.g., Bhaskar et al. 2017; Chava and Roberts 2008; Gao et al. 2017; Kravet 2014; Nash 
et al. 2003; Nini et al. 2012). On the other hand, Bonetti et al. (2017) document a positive relationship between 
accounting conservatism and the presence of unaffiliated bankers on the board, e.g. those who are ex-bankers or 
bankers from non-lending banks, during the mandatory adoption of international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) in Europe. However, the findings of Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017) could not explain if a 
firm employs both an affiliated and an unaffiliated banker on the board. Also, they fail to consider the importance 
of working history of all individual directors on the board, who might have in-depth knowledge about debt market 
and therefore know how much accounting conservatism is needed for debt monitoring.  
This paper aims at contributing to the growing but inconclusive strand of the literature examining the 
role of banking expertise of the boards of directors on accounting conservatism. We believe that the existing 
mixed evidence in the extant literature might be a result of noises in the measures of banking expertise of the 
boards of directors employed by previous studies. Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonnetti et al. (2017), for example, 
use the presence of a banker on the board of directors to indicate banking expertise. We argue that we should 
look further than just the presence of a banker on the board because the level of such banking expertise also 
matters. We offer a new measure of banking expertise on the board using life-time working experience of 
individual directors, which is found to be valuable for corporate outcomes, e.g. Chemmanur et al. (2019) who 
find that more experienced directors lead to better acquisition outcomes, and Drobetz et al. (2018) who show that 
directors with more industry experience help to increase firms’ values.  
There are several reasons to expect that the banking expertise on the board affects accounting 
conservatism. On the one hand, directors who have worked in the banking industry for many years could provide 
boards of directors with information about market-level demand for accounting conservatism so that borrowing 
firms can reduce accounting conservatism, thus may avoid conservatism-related costs (Caskey and Laux 2017; 
Gigler et al. 2009; Heflin et al. 2014; Kravet 2014; Li 2013). Also, directors with banking expertise bring an 
interpersonal network in the banking industry (Engelberg et al. 2012), which can act as a private information-
sharing channel to provide debtholders with better financial information about borrowing firms for debt 
monitoring, the intuition promoted by Erkens et al. (2014), leading to less demand for accounting conservatism. 
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On the other hand, existing literature suggests a positive relationship between the banking expertise on the board 
and accounting conservatim. For example, previous studies show that directors’ working experience leads to 
favorable corporate outcomes (Chemmanur et al. 2019; Chou and Feng 2018; Huang et al. 2014) and less earnings 
management (Faleye et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2015). The presence of banking expertise on boards of directors 
helps to increase the board’s monitoring role, which in turn results in higher accounting conservatism (Bonetti et 
al. 2017). This evidence is consistent with the idea that strong boards of directors lead to more conservative 
earnings (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 2009a). In short, we hypothesise that the banking 
expertise on the board affects accounting conservatism, but we do not predict the direction of the effect because 
the previous findings are mixed on whether bankers help to increase or reduce accounting conservatism (Bonetti 
et al. 2017; Erkens et al. 2014) and whether accounting conservatism is positive (Ahmed et al. 2002; Beatty et al. 
2012; García Lara et al. 2011, 2016; Hu and Jiang 2019; Jain et al. 2019; Kim and Zhang 2016; Lobo et al. 2019; 
Louis et al. 2012; Zhang 2008) or negative (Bhaskar et al. 2017; Chava and Roberts 2008; Gao et al. 2017; Liu 
and Magnan 2016; Nash et al. 2003; Nini et al. 2012). 
We test our hypothesis based on data on the working history of individual directors on the board of 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. We measure banking expertise on the board 
differently by using (i) the total number of years all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks, 
(ii) the total number of banks for which all directors on the board have worked as executives, and (iii) the presence 
of at least one director on the board who has worked as an executive in a bank. We calculate firm-year accounting 
conservatism following previous studies (Basu 1997; García Lara et al. 2016; Khan and Watts 2009). The baseline 
regression results show that accounting conservatism is negatively correlated with our measures of banking 
expertise on the board. The relationship is economically and statistically significant. The findings hold strongly 
for various robustness checks, namely alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism and banking 
expertise on the board, the propensity score matching method to deal with confounding factors, and alternative 
methodologies to estimate the effect of banking expertise on accounting conservatism. In general, the evidence 
supports the first view that banking expertise on the board helps to reduce accounting conservatism.  In general, 
the evidence supports our hypothesis that banking expertise on the board helps to reduce accounting 
conservatism. In final analyses, we investigate the impact of bankruptcy risk and financial leverage on the link 
between banking expertise and accounting conservatism. We conjecture and find that banking expertise on the 
board has more pronounced impacts on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk (low 
ZSCORE) and when firms have high financial leverage.  
The research makes significant contributions to the existing literature. First, we offer an innovative way 
to measure banking expertise based on the working history in the banking industry of all directors on the board, 
which is not considered in recent studies on the effect of the presence of affiliated bankers (Erkens et al. 2014) 
and unaffiliated bankers (Bonetti et al. 2017) on accounting conservatism. Our measure of banking expertise is 
important because previous studies (e.g., Chemmanur et al. 2019; Drobetz et al. 2018; Faleye et al. 2018) show 
that life-time working experience of directors is valuable for firms. Second, our research sample is different from 
that of Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017). In contrast with Erkens et al. (2014), we do not require that 
the firms in the sample have an outstanding lending contract with affiliated banks. Thus, the findings of this study 
may be more generalised. Third, because the research period in this study is the post-IFRS adoption (2005) period 
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in the United Kingdom (UK), change in accounting conservatism is unlikely caused by the shift from local to 
international accounting standards, as documented in the work of Bonetti et al. (2017).  
The results have some implications for boards of directors. The evidence suggests that boards of 
directors should consider the benefits of having directors with banking expertise on the board. However, we do 
not recommend that the board should differentiate directors who have many years of working experience in the 
banking industry from directors who have worked for many banks, because both are relevant in reducing costly 
accounting conservatism.  
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 explains data and methodology, followed by Section 4 which presents 
findings. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Accounting conservatism and bankers on boards of directors 
Accounting conservatism, which involves the recognition of all possible losses but not unverifiable gains, results 
in lower book values relative to economic (or neutral) values of net assets  (Basu 1997; Mora and Walker 2015; 
Ruch and Taylor 2015; Watts 2003). Previous studies show that, together with debt covenants, accounting 
conservatism can be used as a mechanism for debt monitoring (Ahmed et al. 2002; Nikolaev 2010; Watts 2003). 
While debt covenants help to transfer control rights from shareholders to debtholders in certain situations, e.g. 
when borrowing firms face financial distress, accounting conservatism facilitates the violation of debt covenants, 
so that debtholders may take proactive actions to protect themselves in a timely manner (Watts 2003). 
The literature documents that having a banker on the board of directors affects the level of conservatism, 
but the evidence is also mixed. Board members who are working as executives for lending banks (affiliated 
bankers) can serve as an alternative mechanism to mitigate the agency problems of debts (Byrd and Mizruchi 
2005; Dittmann et al. 2010; Erkens et al. 2014; Kroszner and Strahan 2001). For example, Erkens et al. (2014) 
provide evidence that affiliated bankers on the board lead to a decrease in accounting conservatism in borrowing 
firms because they provide lending banks with better information on borrowers’ financial health for debt 
monitoring. This private channel helps borrowing firms avoid costs related to accounting conservatism, as 
documented in the previous studies (Bhaskar et al. 2017; Chava and Roberts 2008; Gao et al. 2017; Nash et al. 
2003; Nini et al. 2012). In contrast, Bonetti et al. (2017) examine the effect of unaffiliated bankers on boards, e.g. 
those who are currently working or used to work for banks that do not have a lending contract with the firm, on 
accounting conservatism before and after the mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe. They find that, compared with 
firms that do not have unaffiliated bankers on the board, firms that have unaffiliated bankers on the board exhibit 
higher accounting conservatism in the post-IFRS period. The authors argue that, unlike affiliated bankers, 
unaffiliated bankers do not face the conflicts of interests between shareholders and debtholders so that they 
contribute to strong boards of directors that are more committed to providing higher accounting conservatism 
(Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 2009a).  
In general, previous studies provide mixed evidence on how bankers on the board of directors contribute 
to the use of accounting conservatism. However, there are increasing concerns that having bankers on the board 
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as a debt monitoring mechanism is costly for borrowing firms (Burak Güner et al. 2008; Hilscher and Şişli-
Ciamarra 2013; Kracaw and Zenner 1998; Rajan 1992; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Also, if a firm has both an 
affiliated banker and an unaffiliated banker on the board, the papers of Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. 
(2017) could not explain. Next, given that each director on the board might have a working history in the banking 
industry, which is highly relevant for debt contracting, Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonetti et al. (2017) fail to 
consider the importance of individual directors’ working experience. This leads to our argument that not just the 
presence of bankers on boards of directors that matters; banking expertise on the board also makes a difference. 
2.2 The role of banking expertise on board of directors 
In this paper, we revisit the relationship between bankers (ex-bankers) on boards of directors and accounting 
conservatism by looking at life-time working experience in the banking industry of board members. Previous 
studies, such as Erkens et al. (2014) and Bonnetti (2017), simply ask if the presence of a banker on the boards 
would influence the level of accounting conservatism. This approach has an advantage that it allows the analysis 
to focus on the network between the lenders and borrowers. However, it does not look at the strength of the 
banking expertise on board. On one hand, a banker with only a few years working in a bank would bring about 
an effect completely different from a director who has worked in the banking industry most of his life. We argue 
that looking more in-depth into not just the presence but also the level of the banking expertise of the board 
directors would offer a better chance for us to explore how banking expertise really drive accounting 
conservatism. On the other hand, we also argue that not just having a banker on the board matters, it is the 
cumulative exposure to the banking industry that the directors together bring to the boards is also important. For 
example, how many banks a firm has connections with through its directors are particularly important in the 
context of the potential impact on accounting conservatism because a firm with a lot of connections with various 
banks would have significantly more opportunities to gain have an information advantage about the market-level 
demand for accounting conservatism.  
To address the above-mentioned weaknesses, this paper proposes a new measure which aggregates the 
life-time working experience in the banking industry of individual board members, as well as the number of 
banks they have worked for. We consider life-time working experience of board members is important because 
it is relevant for corporate outcomes (Chemmanur et al. 2019; Drobetz et al. 2018). For example, Chemmanur et 
al. (2019) argue that human capital of bankers is important for corporations. Firms which are seeking for high-
value added mergers and acquisitions hire investment bankers with relevant advisory experience and these 
bankers provide firms with appropriate skills and experience to identify potential targets. Drobetz et al. (2018) 
find that outside directors with more industry experience bring more benefits for firms, e.g. a premium valuation 
effect, than outside directors with less industry experience. Other studies show that industry experience of 
directors also helps to deter real earnings management using R&D, increase R&D investment (Faleye et al. 2018), 
and increase the value of cash holdings (Chou and Feng 2018). In this paper, we argue that our measure of banking 
expertise on the board is likely to provide more reliable results on the relationship between banking expertise on 
boards of directors and accounting conservatism and hence would provide further insight to the issue amid the 
existing mixed evidence. First, our measure not only captures the presence of a banker on boards but also the 
level of banking expertise that all board members collectively bring about. It allows us to look deeper at the debt-
contracting hypothesis in which banking expertise, not just the network with the lenders, would drive accounting 
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conservatism. Moreover, our evidence is also interesting and adds meaningfully to the recent and growing 
literature which suggests the life-time working experience of directors is valuable for corporate outcomes 
(Chemmanur et al. 2019; Drobetz et al. 2018; Faleye et al. 2018). 
There are competing views on how the banking expertise on the board affects accounting conservatism. 
On the one hand, there is evidence to support the notion that banking expertise on the board may help to reduce 
accounting conservatism. Firstly, directors with banking expertise would have an information advantage about 
the market-level demand for conservatism; hence, having them on the boards can help non-financial firms avoid 
excessive accounting conservatism. For example, Dass et al. (2014) show that firms need information and 
expertise of directors with related industry experience. In this paper, we argue that directors who have worked 
many years in the banking industry could provide boards of directors with informaiton on lending banks’ demand 
for accounting conservatism so that firms could use accounting conservatism at a needed level. By having 
banking expertise on the board, borrowing firms may prevent the acceleration of violation of debt covenants 
caused by accounting conservatism, thus mitigate costs of the violation (Beneish and Press 1993; Bhaskar et al. 
2017; Chava and Roberts 2008; Denis and Wang 2014; Gao et al. 2017; Gigler et al. 2009; Kravet 2014; Li 2013; 
Nash et al. 2003; Nini et al. 2012). Also, having directors with banking expertise may also help firms mitigate 
the costs associated with the presence of affiliated bankers on the board due to conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and debtholders (Burak Güner et al. 2008; Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra 2013; Kracaw and Zenner 
1998; Rajan 1992; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
Secondly, boards of directors with banking expertise often possess an interpersonal network in the 
banking industry that can act as a private communication channel for debt contracting, which helps to reduce 
accouting conservatism. Engelberg et al. (2012) find that an interpersonal network of directors of borrowing firms 
and managers of lending banks, who previously worked or studied together, can help borrowing firms raise debts 
with lower costs and have better subsequent stock performance. Erkens et al. (2014) show that affiliated bankers 
on the board can act as a private channel that provides lending banks with better information to take appropriate 
disciplinary actions in a timelier manner. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that all directors who have worked 
as executives in banks can provide the boards with a network in the banking industry. This private network can 
also give lenders private information of borrowing firms, because it is directly related to debt markets, resulting 
in less demand for accounting conservatism at the firm-specific level. 
On the other hand, previous studies suggest that the banking expertise on the board positively affects 
accounting conservatism. This argument is based on the idea that directors with banking expertise help to increase 
organisational outcomes, and accounting conservatism is an indication of good organisational outcomes. For 
example, Huang et al. (2014) find that directors’ working experience in the banking industry helps firms make 
more acquisitions and have more benefits, e.g. higher announcement returns, lower advisory fees, and higher 
long-term performance. Chemmanur et al. (2019) further show greater deal experience lead to more successful 
acquisitions, suggesting that life-time working experience in a related industry is valuable for firms. Also, there 
is evidence that boards of directors can play the monitoring role, which results in higher organisational outcomes 
(Larcker et al. 2007). A strong board of directors requires managers to report more conservative earnings, which 
are beneficial for firms (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 2009a). This view is consistent with recent 
studies (Faleye et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2015) which find that the industry expertise of directors contributes to a 
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strong board which helps to increase the quality of earnings, e.g. reduce earnings management. Bonetti et al. 
(2017) provide more direct evidence that directors who have banking expertise contribute to a strong board with 
better monitoring role, resulting in higher accounting conservatism.  
In short, the existing literature suggests that banking expertise of boards of directors may affect 
accounting conservatism, but the evidence is mixed. We argue that different directors may provide the board with 
varying levels of banking expertise, which may affect firms’ demand for accounting conservatism. However, we 
do not expect the directional effect of banking expertise on accounting conservatism because accounting 
conservatism has both positive and negative sides. Accounting conservatism is generally expected to provide 
more timely and reliable information, which suggest that investors will be more inclined to consider information 
disclosed by conservative firms reliable. For example, Ahmed et al. (2002) find that conservative accounting 
helps to mitigate the conflicts of interests between shareholders and debtholders over dividend policies and 
Nikolaev (2010) argue that restrictive covenants in public debt contracts are effective only if borrowing firms 
report conservative earnings that include timely loss recognition. Previous studies show that accounting 
conservatism is useful for borrowing firms (Ahmed et al. 2002; Beatty et al. 2012; García Lara et al. 2011, 2016; 
Kim and Zhang 2016; Louis et al. 2012; Zhang 2008). In contrast, there is also evidence of the negative side of 
accounting conservatism. For example, theoretical models of Gigler et al. (2009) and Li (2013) suggest that 
accounting conservatism may negatively affect the efficiency of debt contracts in some circumstances, e.g. when 
the renegotiation of covenants is not viable or is induced by very high costs. Also, accounting conservatism 
accelerates the violation of debt covenants, which, in turn, potentially affects shareholders’ wealth (Bhaskar et 
al. 2017; Chava and Roberts 2008; Gao et al. 2017; Liu and Magnan 2016; Nash et al. 2003; Nini et al. 2012). 
Therefore, we argue that a closer look at life-time working experience of board members would provide more 
reliable evidence on banking expertise on the board has a positive or negative impact on accounting conservatism. 
Our hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, banking expertise on the board of directors affects accounting conservatism. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We use a sample of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. We remove financial 
and utility firms as they are highly regulated firms so that their demand for accounting conservatism may be 
different (see, e.g., Watts 2003). The sample covers the period following the mandatory IFRS adoption in the 
United Kingdom (2005) so that we can control for changes in accounting conservatism due to changes in 
accounting standards (see, e.g., Bonetti et al. 2017). Also, our sample ends in 2012 to avoid the effect of changes 
in corporate governance following the new corporate governance code (Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 2012) 
on accounting conservatism. To mitigate the influence of outliers on the estimation of accounting conservatism, 
we follow Khan and Watts (2009) to delete firms ranked annually in the top 1st and 99th percentiles of earnings, 
depreciation, returns, size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage in each fiscal year. We derive a sample of 3,428 
firm-year observations with sufficient data for the calculation of all variables in the main regression models. 
Table 1 shows the sample selection procedure. 
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Table 1 Sample selection procedure 
Procedure Observations 
Datastream's firm-year observations from 2005 to 2012 (excluding financial, 
insurance and utility firms) 24,168 
Less:  
 
- Observations with missing share price and financial data for measures 
of accounting conservatism -14,692 
 - Observations where share price is less than 0.5 pence -4,120 
 - Observations where book values of equity is less than 0.5 million -226 
 - Observations where financial statements are not in Sterling Pound -14 
 
- Observations with missing data for financial expertise of boards of 
directors -1,688 
Research sample 3,428 
 
3.2 Measures of banking expertise 
This section presents how we measure banking expertise on the board of directors. Based on the list of companies 
downloaded from Datastream, we firstly search for a list of directors for each company in each fiscal year in the 
Bloomberg database. Then we search for the working history of each board member in Bloomberg using the full 
name of directors and the name of companies in which directors are currently serving on the boards (if there is 
no result, we omit the first name and middle name of the director). For each director, we compile a list of 
companies he/she has worked for in the past. If we cannot find a director’s working history in Bloomberg, we 
use the same searching strategy as explained above in Financial Times, then on LinkedIn. For the remained 
directors whose working histories are still missing, we download the corresponding annual reports from Key 
Note and scan the reports for any information on the directors working history. We scan the working history of 
each director to determine whether a director has current or previous working experience in a bank, and we 
document the working position (if available). We determine a director as having working experience in a bank if 
at least one of the companies the director has worked for is on the ‘List of Banks’ provided by the Bank of 
England (Bank of England 2016)1 or has the keywords ‘bank’, ‘BANK’, ‘banks’, or ‘BANKS’ in its name. We 
also require that the working position in banks is executive, which is defined as the position from the head of a 
division and above, excluding the non-executive chairman, independent director, supervisory board member, and 
other roles that are not directly involved in bank business. If we cannot identify the working position, we assume 
it is not an executive role.  
For each company, we capture the banking expertise of all directors who have served on the board of 
firms for at least three months to make sure that directors have a significant influence on the board. We measure 
banking expertise in three different ways. The first measure is the total number of years all directors on the board 
have worked as executives in banks (	), and we refer to this variable as cumulative banking 
expertise on the board. A higher 	 indicates higher banking expertise on the board, because 
individual directors may accumulate banking expertise during many years working as executives in banks. The 
                                                          
1 Our measure of directors’ working experience in the banking industry is reasonably reliable. If a director has worked for a 
bank outside the UK, the name of the bank may also be included in the list, because London has been known as one of the 
leading financial centres in the world for many years. 
8 
 
second measure is the total number of banks for which all directors on the board have worked as executives 
(
	), and we refer to this variable as industry-level banking expertise on the board. A higher 

	 indicates higher banking expertise on the board at the industry level, because working in different 
banks may help individual directors gain market-level banking expertise. While 	 and 

	 are the aggregate measures of levels of banking expertise on the board, we have the third measure 
for the presence of banking expertise on the board (	), which is equal to one if a company has at least 
one director on the board who has worked as an executive in a bank, and zero otherwise. 	 indicates 
whether the board has banking expertise. 
3.3 Measure of accounting conservatism 
For the purpose of this study, we use the firm-year measure of total accounting conservatism following García 
Lara et al. (2016), which is based on Basu (1997)2 and Khan and Watts (2009), because the banking expertise on 
the boards may change over time and across firms and industries, and because total conservatism is better at 
capturing the total effect of conservative accounting on earnings.3 The use of firm-year conservatism is also 
documented in previous studies (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Bonetti et al. 2017; Hu and Jiang 2019; Kong 
et al. 2017; Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008). The remaining part of this section describes the calculation of total 
conservatism following Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009), and García Lara et al. (2016). 
In the model of Basu (1997), the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news is calculated as 
follows: 
, =	 + , + , + , ∗ , +	, 																																																			(1) 
Where: , is net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by the market value of equity 
at the end of year t-1; , is buy-and-hold stock returns for the period from the beginning to the end of fiscal 
year t; and  , is a dummy variable that equals one if , < 0, and zero otherwise. The coefficient  is the 
measure of good news timeliness. The coefficient  is a measure of accounting conservatism, which is the 
incremental timeliness for bad news over good news.  +  is the total timeliness of bad news. In the model, 
 and  are expected to be positive. We run regression (1) for each year in the sample. 
                                                          
2 Although some studies claim that Basu’s model is biased (Caskey and Peterson 2014; Dietrich et al. 2007; Givoly et al. 
2007; Pae et al. 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007), there is emerging and robust evidence that Basu’s coefficient is a 
valid measure for accounting conservatism. Ball et al. (2013b) provide formal tests in different settings and conclude that 
Basu’s coefficient is valid. They explain that a limitation of the work of Basu (1997) is that the author does not provide formal 
econometric and comprehensive analyses to support the model, which could potentially invite questions from researchers 
about the validity of the model. Ball et al. (2013a) provide further evidence to support the validity of Basu’s model. 
3 García Lara et al. (2016, p. 236) provide evidence for the validity of their measure of total accounting conservatism by 
showing that it is strongly related to determinants of accounting conservatism, namely financial leverage, firm size, and 
market-to-book ratio. 
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Based on the model of Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009) construct the empirical measures of the 
timeliness of good news (	) and the incremental timeliness of bad news over good news (	) based 
on firm characteristics as follows:4  
	, =	 =   +  	!," +  #$," +  %&,"																												(2) 
	, =	 = ( + (	!," + (#$," + (%&,"																													(3) 
Where:  * and (* (j = 1-4) are obtained from the following annual cross-sectional regressions: 
, =	 + , + +  +  	!," +  #$," +  %&,",, + 
+( + (	!," + (#$," + (%&,",, ∗ , + 
(-	!," + -#$," + -%&," + -, ∗ 	!," + -., ∗ #$," 						
+ -/, ∗ %&,") + , 																																																																																(4) 
	!," is the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; #$," is the market-
to-book ratio at the end of year t-1; and %&," is the sum of long-term and short-term debts at the end of year 
t-1, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1. The coefficients estimated from equation (4) are 
used in equation (2) to calculate 	 and in equation (3) to calculate 	.  
To estimate total conservatism following García Lara et al. (2016), we add 	 and 	 
together for each company in each year, and we refer to the new variable as 	. After that, we calculate the 
average of 	 across years t-2, t-1, and t (denoted 
	,); then rank 
	, of all firms for each year; 
and divide the rank values by N+1, where N is the total observations in each rank group. We refer to the new 
variable as the annual fractional rank of total accounting conservatism, denoted 	_2,. 	_2, 
ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher 	_2, indicates higher accounting conservatism. The use of rank values 
helps to mitigate nonlinearity concerns and errors in measurements (García Lara et al. 2016; Goh et al. 2017).5 
3.4 Empirical model 
To provide evidence for the Hypothesis H1, we run the following regressions: 
	&	#, = 	3 + , +	(*%, 	 
                                                          
4 Khan and Watts (2009) use SIZE, MTB, and LEV in year t to estimate GSCORE and CSCORE. In this paper, we use SIZE, 
MTB, and LEV in year t-1. We argue that earnings are the incomes of the whole year so that firms may rely on the conditions 
(characterised by LEV, SIZE, and MTB) in year t-1 to make decisions on how much accounting numbers should be 
conservative in year t. The idea of using firm characteristics in year t-1 is also stipulated by Ball et al. (2013a). An example 
of using the same approach to estimate GSCORE and CSCORE is the work of Banker et al. (2012).  
5 We follow García Lara et al. (2016) to run regressions between CONS_RANK and determinants of accounting conservatism, 
which are firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEV), and market-to-book ratio (MTB). The findings (unreported) show that 
CONS_RANK is highly correlated with firm size, financial leverage, and market-to-book ratio (measured in both year t and 
year t-1). 
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+	4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 +	, 																(5) 
Where: 	&	#, is 	_2, which is the annual fractional rank of the three-year 
average of total accounting conservatism in year t. , can be 	,, 
	,, or 
	, (used as substitutes). %, is a vector of firm characteristics associated with accounting 
conservatism. If the coefficient on measures of banking expertise () in regression (5) is statistically significant, 
it is evidence of an association between accounting conservatism and banking expertise. The sign of  will 
indicate whether the banking expertise has a positive or negative effect on accounting conservatism. The 
following part briefly discusses related literature on control variables. 
Leverage (%&) is the first control variable. Prior studies (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et 
al. 2009b, 2016; Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008; Watts 2003) show that the conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and debtholders are high in firms with high %&, so that there is higher contracting demand 
for accounting conservatism for firms with higher %&. We expect that %& has a positive sign. 
Firm size (	!) is the next control variable. Large companies may have higher litigation demand for 
accounting conservatism (Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008). However, large companies may need 
less accounting conservatism because those firms are more visible to the capital markets or have less information 
asymmetry (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008). We expect that 	! 
has a negative sign, as documented in most empirical evidence (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 
2016; Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008).  
The next control variable is the market-to-book ratio (#$). Firms with a high #$ might need more 
accounting conservatism in response to the increased agency costs resulting from more growth options (Khan 
and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008). Also, a high #$ is directly associated with understatement (or 
conservatism) of net assets (Givoly and Hayn 2000; Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008). However, 
beginning MTB may be negatively correlated with accounting conservatism due to a reduction in loss recognition 
which results from unrecognition of increase in asset values (García Lara et al. 2016; Roychowdhury and Watts 
2007). Therefore, we do not expect the sign of MTB. 
Following Ahmed and Duellman (2013), we also control for profitability by using cash flows from 
operations (6), which is equal cash flow from operations in year t scaled by assets at the end of year t. Prior 
research shows that firms with low profitability are more likely to suffer higher costs related to accounting 
conservatism; hence, profitability is positively correlated with accounting conservatism (Ahmed et al. 2002). We 
expect that 6 has a positive sign. 
The next control variable is firm business cycle (5%). Based on Dickinson (2011), CYCLE is a 
dummy variable with a value of one if firms are classified based on cash flows as at mature stage (positive cash 
flows from operating activities, negative cash flows from investing activities, and negative cash flows from 
financing activities), and zero if firms are classified as at young stage (negative cash flows from operating 
activities, negative cash flows from investing activities, and positive cash flows from financing activities), or 
growth stage (positive cash flows from operating activities, negative cash flows from investing activities, and 
positive cash flows from financing activities). The existing literature provides mixed evidence. On the one hand, 
mature firms are more likely to face high litigation risks so that they demand a high degree of accounting 
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conservatism (Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and Watts 2008). On the other hand, mature firms need less external 
financing for business expansions (Dickinson 2011); therefore, they need less accounting conservatism.  We 
expect that 5% is associated with accounting conservatism but do not predict its sign.  
Sale growth (∆	%) is the next control variable. ∆	%  is equal to change in sales from year t-1 to 
year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t. The evidence is mixed about the effects of ∆	% on accounting 
conservatism. Firms with higher growth have more information asymmetry, which results in more demand for 
accounting conservatism (LaFond and Watts 2008). In contrast, studies also document that it is possible that 
growth may result in less asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news (Ball et al. 2013a). We expect that 
∆	% is associated with accounting conservatism but do not predict its sign.  
Next, we control for debt issuance ($		4) and seasoned equity offering (	). $		4 is 
a dummy variable with the value of one if the change in short-term and long-term debts from the end of year t-1 
to the end of year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t, is positive and more than 5%, and zero otherwise. 
	 is a dummy variable with the value of one if a firm increases outstanding shares in year t by at least 5% with 
positive proceeds from equity issuance, and zero otherwise. As discussed above, debt financing results in higher 
demand for accounting conservatism as a mechanism for debt monitoring (Erkens et al. 2014; García Lara et al. 
2016; Goh et al. 2017; Watts 2003). However, in a recent paper, Goh et al. (2017) show that accounting 
conservatism is positively correlated with the choice of equity issuance versus debt issuance when firms need 
significant external capital. Also, recent research (Kim et al. 2013) provides empirical evidence that firms with 
	9 use accounting conservatism to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on returns around 
	 announcements. Therefore, we expect that 	 have a positive sign but do not expect a sign for 
DEBTISSUE. Variable calculations are presented in the Appendix. 
If  in regression (5) is negative and significant, it is evidence of a negative association between 
accounting conservatism and the banking expertise on the board in line with our hypothesis. 
4 Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the selected variables. While Panel A reports the statistics of the full 
sample, Panel B shows those of firms with and without banking expertise on the board of directors. Looking at 
Panel A, firm characteristics’ statistics are similar to prior research that uses similar data (e.g., Goh and Gupta 
2016). The statistics show that the sample has more young and growth firms than mature firms (median of 5% 
is 0) and more firms that do not have seasoned equity offering or debt issuance in the fiscal year than firms that 
do (medians of 	 and $		4 are 0). In addition, the descriptive statistics indicate that y	 
has a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 42. This means that the number of years that all directors on the board 
have worked as executives in banks can reach 42 years. On average, the boards have 2.57 years of experience in 
the banking industry (MEAN of 	). Similarly, the statistics show that the largest number of banks 
for which all directors on the board have worked as executives is 6 (MAX of 
	), and, on average, 
all directors on the board have worked for 0.44 banks (MEAN of 
	). Moreover, the mean and 
median of 	 are 0.23 and 0, respectively, suggesting that more observations do not have banking 
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expertise on the board than observations that do. Those impressive statistics could make a difference in 
accounting practices such as conservatism, which is under investigation in this study. Finally, the proxy for firm-
year accounting conservatism (	_2) varies from 0.01 to 0.99, with a mean of 0.50. 
Turning to Panel B of Table 2, we find that accounting conservatism is lower in groups of observations 
with banking expertise on the board than in those without banking expertise on the board, and mean differences 
in accounting conservatism between two groups are statistically significant. Second, further statistics on 
	  and 
	 indicate that the means of cumulative and industry-level banking expertise of 
the treatment group are 11.23 and 1.92, respectively, while those of the control group equal 0 by definition. Also, 
the results of the t-test show that most differences in firm characteristics between two groups are significant at 
the 5% level. 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlations among the selected variables. The negative and significant 
correlations of 	_2 with 	, 
	 and 	 suggest that the measures of 
banking expertise on the board are associated with a reduction in accounting conservatism. The correlations 
among the independent variables are generally not too high (no pair-wise correlation coefficient is higher than 
0.29) and insignificant in many cases. Therefore, it is unlikely that multicollinearity among independent variables 
is a major concern in this study. 
4.2 Baseline regression results 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the main regression (5) between 	_2 and our measures of 
banking expertise on the board. Most control variables have expected signs and are statistically significant. The 
coefficients on 	 (column a), 
	 (column b), and 	 (column c) are negative 
and significant at the 5% level (t-statistics are -1.78, -2.28, and -3.16, respectively). Also, the relationships are 
economically significant. For example, in column (a), the coefficient on 	 means that when the 
board has one additional year of banking expertise, 	_2 decreases by 0.00072.6 Although a one-year 
increase in 	 is associated with only a reduction of 0.144% in 	_2 (=0.00072/0.5, where 
0.5 is the mean of 	_2 reported in Table 2), it is more likely that an individual director could work for 
banks in many years; therefore, the marginal effect of an appointment of a director with banking expertise on the 
board is significant in economic terms. In column (b), one unit increase in 
	 is associated with a 
decrease by 0.00612 (a 1.22% reduction) in 	_2. Also, it is more likely that a director may work for 
several banks; therefore, the marginal effect of having a director with banking expertise on the board is 
economically significant. Similarly, in column (c), compared with firms without banking expertise on the board, 
firms with banking expertise on the board have less accounting conservatism by 0.02127, a 4.25% reduction in 
	_2 which is non-trivial. Overall, we find that accounting conservatism is negatively affected by levels 
of banking expertise on the board, and the effect is statistically and economically significant.  
  
                                                          
6 A note is that coefficients reported the table are already multiplied by 100. 
13 
 
Table 2  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
 N MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX   
ATi,t 3428 1,545 192 4,583 0 50,806   
SALEi,t 3428 1,296 188 3,796 0 60,931   
IBi,t 3428 103 8 451 -1,426 6,893   
RETi,t 3428 0.14 0.07 0.56 -0.98 6.21   
CONS_RANKi,t 3428 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.01 0.99   
CSCORE_RANKi,t 3428 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.01 0.99   
yEXPERTISEi,t 3428 2.57 0.00 6.87 0.00 42.00   
mEXPERTISEi,t 3428 1.05 0.00 2.22 0.00 10.00   
aEXPERTISEi,t 3428 0.44 0.00 1.04 0.00 6.00   
EXPERTISEi,t 3428 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00   
LEVi,t 3428 0.32 0.16 0.50 0.00 3.12   
SIZEi,t 3428 12.16 12.08 2.03 7.63 17.38   
MTBi,t 3428 2.93 1.94 3.37 0.32 22.83   
CFOi,t 3428 0.08 0.08 0.11 -0.46 0.34   
∆SALEi,t 3428 0.11 0.07 0.25 -0.62 1.21   
CYCLEi,t 3428 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00   
SEOi,t 3428 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00   
DEBTISSUEi,t 3428 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00   
PPEi,t 3428 0.44 0.34 0.37 0.01 1.53   
         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics by firms with and without banking expertise on the board 
  EPXERTISE = 1 (N = 785) EXPERTISE = 0 (N = 2,643) T-test 
  MEAN MEDIAN STD MEAN MEDIAN STD MEAN t-statistic 
CONS_RANKi,t 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.55 0.56 0.28 0.217*** 19.91 
CSCORE_RANKi,t 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.55 0.56 0.28 0.216*** 19.83 
yEXPERTISEi,t 11.23 8.00 10.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.23*** -30.11 
mEXPERTISEi,t 4.60 4.00 2.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.600*** -55.98 
aEXPERTISEi,t 1.92 1.00 1.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.922*** -38.99 
LEVi,t 0.29 0.16 0.46 0.33 0.15 0.52 0.044** 2.25 
SIZEi,t 13.45 13.49 2.01 11.78 11.74 1.88 -1.670*** -20.77 
MTBi,t 3.33 2.25 3.57 2.81 1.86 3.30 -0.526*** -3.68 
CFOi,t 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.025*** -6.23 
∆SALEi,t 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.27 0.021** 2.36 
CYCLEi,t 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.24 -0.010 -1.00 
SEOi,t 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.048*** 4.48 
DEBTISSUEi,t 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.012 0.70 
PPEi,t 0.46 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.33 0.37 -0.023 -1.59 
The table reports descriptive statistics of selected variables. Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the full sample, 
including the number of observations (N), mean (MEAN), median (MEDIAN), standard deviation (STD), min 
(MIN), and max (MAX). Panel B shows descriptive statistics by two groups: observations with banking expertise 
on the board (EXPERTISE = 1) and observations without banking expertise on the board (EXPERTISE = 0). 
This panel also shows mean differences between the two groups and the t-statistics obtained from the t-tests under 
the null that the difference is zero. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3 Pearson Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ATi,t  1 1.00          
SALEi,t  2 0.86* 1.00         
IBi,t  3 0.82* 0.71* 1.00        
RETi,t 4 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 1.00       
CONS_RANKi,t 5 -0.40* -0.40* -0.33* 0.04* 1.00      
CSCORE_RANKi,t 6 -0.43* -0.42* -0.33* 0.05* 0.93* 1.00     
yEXPERTISEi,t 7 0.31* 0.27* 0.27* 0.01 -0.28* -0.28* 1.00    
mEXPERTISEi,t 8 0.27* 0.25* 0.25* -0.00 -0.28* -0.28* 0.80* 1.00   
aEXPERTISEi,t 9 0.29* 0.24* 0.23* 0.01 -0.31* -0.31* 0.88* 0.71* 1.00  
EXPERTISEi,t 10 0.25* 0.22* 0.21* 0.01 -0.32* -0.32* 0.69* 0.87* 0.77* 1.00 
LEVi,t 11 0.08* 0.03* -0.05* -0.16* 0.23* 0.05* -0.03 -0.05* -0.01 -0.04* 
SIZEi,t 12 0.57* 0.54* 0.46* 0.11* -0.82* -0.86* 0.32* 0.32* 0.34* 0.35* 
MTBi,t 13 0.02 0.03 0.09* 0.15* -0.19* -0.16* 0.07* 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* 
CFOi,t 14 0.07* 0.08* 0.12* 0.16* -0.22* -0.23* 0.10* 0.10* 0.09* 0.09* 
∆SALEi,t 15 -0.04* -0.01 -0.02 0.13* 0.02 0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* 
CYCLEi,t 16 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.04* 0.04* 0.03 0.02 
SEOi,t 17 -0.09* -0.10* -0.08* 0.05* 0.16* 0.17* -0.06* -0.06* -0.07* -0.07* 
DEBTISSUEi,t 18 0.04* 0.01 0.02 -0.09* -0.05* -0.06* -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
PPEi,t 19 0.07* 0.05* 0.05* 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (Continued)   11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
LEVi,t 11 1.00          
SIZEi,t 12 -0.04* 1.00         
MTBi,t 13 -0.18* 0.21* 1.00        
CFOi,t 14 -0.07* 0.28* 0.04* 1.00       
∆SALEi,t 15 -0.08* 0.02 0.10* 0.16* 1.00      
CYCLEi,t 16 0.02 0.05* -0.03 0.02 -0.14* 1.00     
SEOi,t 17 -0.05* -0.14* 0.03 -0.29* 0.12* -0.05* 1.00    
DEBTISSUEi,t 18 0.18* 0.07* 0.05* -0.08* 0.18* -0.10* 0.06* 1.00   
PPEi,t 19 0.17* 0.08* -0.06* 0.17* -0.00 -0.04* -0.06* 0.17* 1.00  
The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. * is significance at 5%. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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Table 4  Baseline regression results on the relationship between CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise on the board 
  
Expected 
signs 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.072* -1.78       
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.612** -2.28    
EXPERTISEi,t -       -2.127*** -3.16 
LEVi,t + 12.280*** 21.76  12.295*** 21.79  12.263*** 21.75 
SIZEi,t - -11.631*** -73.66  -11.596*** -72.65  -11.555*** -72.41 
MTBi,t +/- 0.099 1.23  0.097 1.21  0.100 1.24 
CFOi,t + 7.282*** 2.87  7.127*** 2.81  7.111*** 2.80 
∆SALEi,t +/- 5.176*** 4.78  5.186*** 4.79  5.177*** 4.79 
CYCLEi,t +/- 4.223*** 3.94  4.217*** 3.93  4.212*** 3.93 
SEOi,t + 6.256*** 6.91  6.223*** 6.88  6.232*** 6.89 
DEBTISSUEi,t +/- -2.163*** -3.33  -2.163*** -3.33  -2.189*** -3.37 
Constant  1.890*** 51.59  1.888*** 51.50  1.885*** 51.44 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2   0.749     0.749     0.749   
Column (a) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 	_2, 	= 3 + 	, + %&, + 	!, + #$, + .6, +
/∆SALE, + >5%, + ?	, + @$		4, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
Column (b) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 	_2, 	= 3 + 
	, + %&, + 	!, + #$, + .6, +
/∆SALE, + >5%, + ?	, + @$		4, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
Column (c) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 	_2, 	= 3 + 	, + %&, + 	!, + #$, + .6, +
/∆SALE, + >5%, + ?	, + @$		4, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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The evidence supports the hypothesis that the banking expertise on the board affects accounting 
conservatism. The findings are consistent with the view that the banking expertise on the board leads to a 
decrease, rather than an increase, in accounting conservatism. A possible explanation is that directors with 
banking expertise provide boards of directors with relevant knowledge on lending banks’ demand for accounting 
conservatism so that firms avoid reporting excessive conservatism, which is costly for firms. Also, boards of 
directors with banking expertise often possess an interpersonal network in the banking industry that can act as a 
private communication channel for debt contracting, which also helps to reduce accouting conservatism. 
4.3 Alternative measures of accounting conservatism and banking expertise 
4.3.1 Alternative measure of firm-year accounting conservatism 
In the baseline regression, we use total accounting conservatism following García Lara et al. (2016), which is 
based on Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009). Although García Lara et al. (2016, p. 236) indicate that their 
measure of total accounting conservatism is strongly related to determinants of accounting conservatism, we are 
concerned whether our findings hold with traditional proxies for accounting conservatism.  
To deal with this concern, we employ two other measures of firm-year accounting conservatism. First, 
we use the measure of asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news (Khan and Watts 2009). In other 
words, we use CSCORE obtained from Equation (3) rather than CONS. We also calculate CSCORE_RANK, 
which is the annual fractional rank of three-year average of CSCORE, in the same way with the calculation of 
CONS_RANK. We then use CSCORE_RANK as an alternative measure of firm-year accounting conservatism. 
Second, we calculate the negative accumulation of non-operating accruals introduced by Givoly and 
Hayn (2000). Non-operating accruals do not include accruals from depreciation, amortisation and operating 
accruals. Instead, non-operating accruals mostly include accruals from items whose timing and amount 
recognised are affected by the discretion of managers, such as bad debt provisions, restructuring charges, changes 
in accounting estimates, disposals of assets, write-downs of assets, or revenue deferrals. Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
argue that the negative accumulation of non-accruals is an indicator of accounting conservatism. They also find 
that the negative accumulation of non-accruals is related to timely recognition of bad news over good news. 
Similar to CONS_RANK and CSCORE_RANK, we calculate NOACC_RANK which is annual fractional rank 
of the three-year average of the negative accumulation of non-operating accruals.  
Table 5 reports the findings of the regression (5) where CONS_RANK is replaced by CSCORE_RANK 
(Panel A) and NOACC_RANK (Panel B) as the dependent variable. The evidence shows that there are negative 
and significant relationships between CSCORE_RANK and NOACC_RANK with different measures of banking 
expertise on boards of directors. In general, our findings on the effect of banking expertise on accounting 
conservatism hold for those two alternative measures of accounting conservatism.
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Table 5 Alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism 
  yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Panel A: Relationship between CSCORE_RANK and measures of banking expertise on the boards 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.041 -1.04       
aEXPERTISEi,t    -0.448* -1.70    
EXPERTISEi,t       -1.655** -2.50 
Controls Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2 0.757     0.757     0.757   
Panel B: Relationship between NOACC_RANK and measures of banking expertise on the boards 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.105 -1.43       
aEXPERTISEi,t    -0.830* -1.70    
EXPERTISEi,t       -3.220*** -2.63 
Controls Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3406   3406   3406  
Adjusted R2 0.174     0.175     0.175   
The table reports the results of the estimation of the relationship between alternative measures of firm-year accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the boards of 
directors. In Panel A and B, we replace CONS_RANK in the regression (5) by CSCORE_RANK and NOACC_RANK, respectively. Controls are included in all models, but 
we do not report them and the constant term to save space. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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4.3.2 Alternative measure of banking expertise 
Our next concern is that the measures of banking expertise, e.g. yEXPERTISE, may inflate the levels of 
banking expertise on boards of directors, therefore there may be estimation errors. To mitigate this concern, we 
use the average number of years all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks, denoted 
mEXPERTISE, as an alternative measure of banking expertise. As reported in Table 6, the results show that the 
coefficient on mEXPERTISE is negative and statistically significant when the dependent variable are 
CONS_RANK (column a) and NOACC_RANK (column c), while it is still negative when the dependent variable 
is CSCORE_RANK (column b). In general, the evidence is consistent with the baseline regression results.7 
4.4 Propensity score matching 
Because this research is a non-experimental study, there may be possible confounding factors which may affect 
both accounting conservatism and the presence of banking expertise on the board (see, e.g., Gow et al. 2016; 
Shipman et al. 2017). The presence of directors with banking expertise on the board may not be random because 
it can be affected by firm characteristics (Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra 2013; Kang and Kim 2017; Kroszner and 
Strahan 2001). Similar to the work of Erkens et al. (2014), we construct a propensity score matching sample to 
eliminate the effect of confounding factors. We firstly classify observations into two groups: observations where 
firms have directors with banking expertise on the board  (treatments) and observations where firms do not have 
directors with banking expertise on the board (controls). We then run a probit regression to estimate the 
probability of having directors with banking expertise on the board based on explanatory variables, which are 
control variables used in the main regressions (debt-to-asset ratio, firm size, market-to-book ratio, cash flow-to-
asset ratio, sale growth, business cycle, seasoned equity offering, and debt issuance). Based on the conditional 
odd ratio of having directors with banking expertise on the board, we match each treatment with four controls 
having the closest odd ratio and a maximum caliper of 0.01. The final matched sample has 2,590 firm-year 
observations (679 treatments and 1,911 controls). We also perform a simple t-test and find that (unreported) 
differences in firm characteristics between the two groups are insignificant at the 1% level. This procedure is 
similar to what is suggested by Shipman et al. (2017). 
Table 7 shows the results of the regression (5) with the propensity-score-matching sample. In Panel A, 
we find that CONS_RANK is negatively correlated with four different measures of banking expertise on boards 
of directors. The magnitudes of the coefficients on banking expertise are broadly equivalent to those reported in 
Table 4. In Panel B and C, we find similar evidence on the negative relationship between CSCORE_RANK and 
NOACC_RANK with banking expertise. In short, the results in this section suggest that the link between the 
banking expertise on board of directors and accounting conservatism is less likely affected by confounding 
factors. 
                                                          
7 When we use the average number of banks directors have worked for, the results are statistically unchanged. 
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Table 6  Alternative measures of banking expertise 
  CONS_RANK (a)  CSCORE_RANK (b)  NOACC_RANK (c) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
mEXPERTISEi,t -0.255** -2.04  -0.136 -1.11  -0.445** -1.96 
LEVi,t 12.250*** 21.70  1.100** 1.98  2.553** 2.49 
SIZEi,t -11.622*** -73.71  -12.334*** -79.58  -0.111 -0.39 
MTBi,t 0.100 1.24  0.160** 2.04  0.497*** 3.39 
CFOi,t 7.306*** 2.88  7.530*** 3.02  24.304*** 5.21 
∆SALEi,t 5.174*** 4.78  5.965*** 5.60  27.958*** 14.17 
CYCLEi,t 4.236*** 3.95  3.574*** 3.39  -11.681*** -6.00 
SEOi,t 6.279*** 6.94  5.341*** 6.01  9.013*** 5.47 
DEBTISSUEi,t -2.177*** -3.35  -0.534 -0.84  0.268 0.23 
Constant 1.890*** 51.63  2.006*** 55.76  0.282*** 3.77 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 3428   3428   3406  
Adjusted R2 0.749   0.757   0.175  
The table reports the findings of regressions between the alternative measure of banking expertise on the boards of directors (mEXPERTISE) and three different firm-year 
measures of accounting conservatism. 
Column (a) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 	_2, 	= 3 + A	, + %&, + 	!, + #$, + .6, +
/∆SALE, + >5%, + ?	, + @$		4, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
Column (b) reports the results of estimating the following regression: 	_2, 		= 3 + A	, + %&, + 	!, + #$, + .6, +
/∆SALE, + >5%, + ?	, + @$		4, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
Column (c) reports the results of estimating the following regression: _2, 		= 3 + A	, + %&, + 	!, + #$, + .6, +
/∆SALE, + >5%, + ?	, + @$		4, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7  Propensity score matching 
  
Expected 
signs 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c)   mEXPERTISE (d) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Panel A: CONS_RANK and banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.117** -2.56          
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.887*** -2.96       
EXPERTISEi,t -       -2.569*** -3.58    
mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.316** -2.34 
Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  2590   2590   2590   2590  
Adjusted R2   0.704     0.704     0.705     0.704   
Panel B: CSCORE_RANK and banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.095** -2.11          
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.730** -2.46       
EXPERTISEi,t -       -2.144*** -3.02    
mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.226* -1.69 
Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  2590   2590   2590   2590  
Adjusted R2   0.705     0.705     0.705     0.704   
Panel B: NOACC_RANK and banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.085 -1.06          
aEXPERTISEi,t -    -0.679 -1.30       
EXPERTISEi,t -       -3.155** -2.52    
mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.432* -1.84 
Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  2590   2590   2590   2590  
Adjusted R2   0.705     0.705     0.705     0.704   
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Table 7  Propensity score matching (continued) 
This table reports findings with the propensity score matching sample. To construct the propensity score matching sample, we first run a probit regression to estimate the 
probability of having directors with banking expertise on the board based on explanatory variables, which are the same with control variables used in the main regressions (debt-
to-asset ratio, firm size, market-to-book ratio, cash flow-to-asset ratio, sale growth, business cycle, seasoned equity offering, and debt issuance). Based on the conditional odd 
ratio of having directors with banking expertise on the board, we match each treatment with four controls having the closest odd ratio and a maximum caliper of 0.01. We also 
perform a simple t-test and find that (unreported) differences in firm characteristics are insignificant at the 1% level.  
In Panel A, B, and C, we use CONS_RANK, CSCORE_RANK, and NOACC_RANK, respectively, as the dependent variable (used as substitutes) in our models. All coefficients 
are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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In another approach, we use the two-stage Heckman procedure (e.g., Lennox et al. 2012). In the first 
stage, we run a probit regression to predict the probability of the presence of at least one director who has worked 
as an executive in a bank on the board of directors based on firm characteristics. After the first stage, we test 
correlations between the error terms in equation (5) and those in the Heckman’s first-stage regression. The 
findings (unreported) indicate that we cannot reject the null that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero at the 
1% significant level, suggesting that the OLS estimations reported in Table 4 are not biased. 
4.5 Alternative methods to estimate the effects of banking expertise on accounting conservatism 
4.5.1 Original Basu (1997)’s model 
To test whether the findings are robust, we employ the model of Basu (1997) to measure the asymmetric 
timeliness of bad news over good news as a proxy of accounting conservatism. Following prior research (e.g., 
Erkens et al. 2014; Hu and Jiang 2019; Kong et al. 2017; Lin 2014), we interact the measures of banking expertise 
on the board with the variables in the model. We also follow Ball et al. (2013a) to include industry and year fixed 
effects to mitigate heterogeneity bias. The model is as follows:  
, =	3 + , + , + , ∗ , +	(, ∗ , + ( ∗ , ∗ , + (, ∗ , ∗ ,
+ 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + , .																																								(6) 
Where: , is 	,, 
	,, 	,, or A	, (used as 
substitutes). Variable definitions are in the appendix. The coefficient ( indicates the effect of banking expertise 
on the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news. We expect that ( is negative and significant.  
Table 8 reports the findings of regression (6). We find that the coefficient ( is negative across all 
measure of banking expertise and statistically significant in column (b) and (c). The evidence is consistent with 
our main findings that banking expertise on the board has a negative impact on accounting conservatism.  
4.5.2 Ball and Shivakumar (2008)’s model 
Next, we follow Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Ball and Shivakumar (2008) to use the timeliness of loss 
recognition as an alternative proxy for accounting conservatism. We also interact the measures of banking 
expertise on the board with other variables in the model as follows (see, e.g., Kong et al. 2017): 
, =	3 + 6, + 6, + 6, ∗ 6, + ∆	%, + ., +	(6, ∗ ,
+ ( ∗ 6, ∗ , + (6, ∗ 6, ∗ , + 4	5	6	66	
+ 5	6	66	 + , 																																																																																																(7) 
Where: , is 	, 
	, 	, or A	 (used as substitutes). 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  
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Table 8  Applying the Basu (1997)’s to estimate the effect of banking expertise on the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over good news 
  
Expected 
sign 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c)   mEXPERTISE (d) 
Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Di,t  4.025* 1.87  4.232* 1.95  4.445** 1.98  4.077* 1.85 
RETi,t + 2.750 1.59  2.673 1.53  2.849 1.59  2.811 1.60 
Di,t*RETi,t + 33.740*** 6.04  35.321*** 6.26  36.591*** 6.25  34.574*** 6.05 
Di,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  -0.047 -0.18          
RETi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  0.038 0.19          
Di,t*RETi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.695 -0.81          
Di,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     -0.930 -0.57       
RETi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     0.400 0.33       
Di,t*RETi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t -    -9.125* -1.70       
Di,t*EXPERTISEi,t        -2.610 -0.63    
RETi,t*EXPERTISEi,t        -0.237 -0.08    
Di,t*RETi,t*EXPERTISEi,t -       -21.700* -1.75    
Di,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.189 -0.24 
RETi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.012 -0.02 
Di,t*RETi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -2.503 -1.03 
Constant  0.087 1.01  0.087 1.01  0.083 0.97  0.086 1.00 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3428   3428   3428   3428  
Adjusted R2   0.026   0.027   0.028   0.027  
Column (a) reports the results of estimating the following regression: , =	3 + , + , + , ∗ , +	(, ∗ 	, + ( ∗ , ∗
	, + (, ∗ , ∗ 	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
Column (b) reports the results of estimating the following regression: , =	3 + , + , + , ∗ , +	(, ∗ 
	, + ( ∗ , ∗

	, + (, ∗ , ∗ 
	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
Column (c) reports the results of estimating the following regression: , =	3 + , + , + , ∗ , +	(, ∗ 	, + ( ∗ , ∗
	, + (, ∗ , ∗ 	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
Column (d) reports the results of estimating the following regression: , =	3 + , + , + , ∗ , +	(, ∗ A	, + ( ∗ , ∗
A	, + (, ∗ , ∗ A	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Dechow et al. (1998), among others, show that accruals have a contemporaneous negative relationship 
with operating cash flows. Thus,  is expected to be negative. In addition, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue 
that good news and bad news affect the revisions of both current cash flows and expected future cash flows 
because cash flows generated from an asset are more likely to be correlated. Current-period accruals include the 
timely recognition of good news (gains) and bad news (losses), which reflect changes in expected future cash 
flows. Therefore, the asymmetric timely recognition of economic gains (good news) and losses (bad news) causes 
a positive relationship between current-period accruals and current-period cash flows.  is the incremental 
timeliness in recognition of bad news over good news, which is used as a measure of accounting conservatism. 
It is predicted that  is positive, because accruals are more likely to reflect losses in periods with negative cash 
flows. In the model (7), the coefficient ( shows the effect of the banking expertise on the asymmetric timelines 
of loss recognition. We expect that ( is negative and significant. 
Table 9 reports the findings of regression (7). The evidence shows that the coefficient on ( is negative 
and significant in nearly every case. The results suggest that the measures of banking expertise have a 
significantly negative effect on asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition. 
4.6 Cross-sectional analyses 
So far, our main results show that banking expertise on boards of directors negatively affects accounting 
conservatism. In this section, we do cross-sectional analyses to see how the effect of banking expertise on 
accounting conservatism varies with bankruptcy risk and financial leverage.  
4.6.1 Bankruptcy risk 
We conjecture that the effect of financial expertise on boards of directors on accounting conservatism 
is more pronounced for firms having higher bankruptcy risk. Opler and Titman (1994) document that firms with 
financial distress experience a decline in corporate performance. In those circumstances, debtholders are more 
likely to demand more borrowing firms’ accounting conservatism, which facilitates the violation of debt 
covenants and the transfer to control rights from shareholders to debtholders (e.g., Watts 2003). However, the 
violation of debt covenants prevents borrowers from investing in profitable projects (Nash et al. 2003) and has 
other consequences such as increases in operating and restructuring costs (Beneish and Press 1993; Bhaskar et 
al. 2017; Gao et al. 2017), thus limits their opportunities to increase their corporate performance. Previous studies 
also find that boards of directors help to reduce bankcrupty risk (Chen 2008; Fich and Slezak 2008). As a 
consequence, directors with working experience in the banking industry could help borrowing firms not only 
access external capital (e.g., Engelberg et al. 2012) but also reduce excessive costly accounting conservatism. 
To test this conjecture, we run the regression (5) using subsamples of firms with high and low 
bankruptcy risk. We employ the ZSCORE (Altman 1968; Taffler 1983) as a measure of bankruptcy risk, with a 
lower ZSCORE indicating higher bankruptcy risk. We rank ZSCORE of all firms in the sample and define that 
firms have a high (low) bankruptcy risk when its ZSCORE in year t-1 is smaller than or equal (greater) than the 
median level of all firms.  
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Table 9  Applying the Ball and Shivakumar (2008) model to estimate the effect of banking expertise on the timeliness of loss recognition 
  Expected 
sign 
yEXPERTISE (a)   aEXPERTISE (b)   EXPERTISE (c)   mEXPERTISE (d) 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
DCFOi,t  0.185 0.36  -0.008 -0.02  -0.020 -0.04  0.130 0.25 
CFOi,t - -40.139*** -28.35  -39.943*** -28.05  -41.667*** -27.93  -42.323*** -28.63 
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t + 28.500*** 16.69  28.488*** 16.58  30.238*** 17.02  30.722*** 17.44 
∆SALEi,t + 8.459*** 18.30  8.437*** 18.26  8.399*** 18.21  8.433*** 18.31 
PPEi,t - -2.075*** -4.41  -2.060*** -4.38  -2.039*** -4.34  -2.009*** -4.28 
DCFOi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  -0.052 -0.51          
CFOi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t  0.279** 2.04          
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*yEXPERTISEi,t - -0.913 -1.18          
DCFOi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     0.232 0.37       
CFOi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t     1.253 1.34       
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*aEXPERTISEi,t -    -10.154** -2.43       
DCFOi,t*EXPERTISEi,t        0.439 0.33    
CFOi,t*EXPERTISEi,t        8.539*** 3.75    
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*EXPERTISEi,t -       -17.762*** -3.38    
DCFOi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -0.091 -0.37 
CFOi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           2.061*** 5.12 
DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*mEXPERTISEi,t           -3.103** -2.48 
Constant  0.005 0.28  0.003 0.16  0.004 0.21  0.006 0.30 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry fixed effects  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  3421   3421   3421   3421  
Adjusted R2   0.348     0.348     0.351     0.352   
Column (a) reports the findings of the regression: , =	3 + 6, + 6, + 6, ∗ 6, +	∆	%, + ., + (6, ∗ 	, +
( ∗ 6, ∗ 	, + (6, ∗ 6, ∗ 	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,.  
Column (b) reports the findings of the regression: , =	3 + 6, + 6, + 6, ∗ 6, + ∆	%, + ., +	(6, ∗ 
	, +
( ∗ 6, ∗ 
	, + (6, ∗ 6, ∗ 
	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
Column (c) reports the findings of the regression: , =	3 + 6, + 6, + 6, ∗ 6, + ∆	%, + ., +	(6, ∗ 	, +
( ∗ 6, ∗ 	, + (6, ∗ 6, ∗ 	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
Column (d) reports the findings of the regression: , =	3 + 6, + 6, + 6, ∗ 6, + ∆	%, + ., +	(6, ∗ A	, +
( ∗ 6, ∗ A	, + (6, ∗ 6, ∗ A	, + 4	5	6	66	 + 5	6	66	 + ,. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream level-six codes. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 10 reports findings with subsamples of firms with high and low bankruptcy risk. Panel A, B, and 
C show results when accounting conservatism is CONS_RANK, CSCORE_RANK, and NOACC_RANK, 
respectively. Looking at Panel A, we observe that the magnitudes of the coefficients on banking expertise are 
considerably higher for firms with a low ZSCORE than for firms with a high ZSCORE. Importantly, we find that 
the coefficients on banking expertise are significant in subsamples of firms with a low ZSCORE, but not 
significant for those with a high ZSCORE. We obtain similar results in Panel B and C. In general, the evidence 
supports our conjecture that the effect of the board’s banking expertise on accounting conservatism is more 
pronounced when firms have high bankruptcy risk. 
4.6.2 Financial leverage 
In our final analysis, we examine how financial leverage affects the relationship between banking expertise on 
boards of directors and accounting conservatism. Highly levered firms face restrictive debt covenants and have 
a high demand for accounting conservatism as a debt monitoring mechanism (Khan and Watts 2009; LaFond and 
Watts 2008; Watts 2003). Because the violation of debt covenants is costly (Chava and Roberts 2008; Gao et al. 
2017; Nash et al. 2003; Nini et al. 2012) and accounting conservatism may have negative impact on shareholders’ 
wealth (Beneish and Press 1993; Bhaskar et al. 2017; Gao et al. 2017; Nash et al. 2003), highly levered firms are 
more likely to rely on financial expertise on boards of directors to mitigate the negative consequences of 
accounting conservatism. In general, we predict that the effect of banking expertise on accounting conservatism 
is more pronounced for firms with high financial leverage than for firms with low financial leverage. 
To provide evidence for this prediction, we also run the regression (5) with subsamples: firms with high 
and low financial leverage. We define firms with high (low) financial leverage as having financial leverage (LEV) 
in year t-1 greater than or equal (lower) than the median of all firms. Table 11 reports findings with those 
subsamples. Panel A, B, and C present results of regressions where the dependent variable is CONS_RANK, 
CSCORE_RANK, and NOACC_RANK, respectively. In nearly every case across all columns and all panels, we 
find robust evidence that the coefficients on financial expertise are substantially higher for firms with high 
financial leverage than for firms with low financial leverage. Also, the coefficients on financial expertise are (not) 
significant or firms with high (low) financial leverage. In short, the evidence is consistent with our prediction 
that the effect of banking expertise on accounting conservatism is more pronounced when firms have high 
financial leverage.  
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Table 10  Cross-sectional analysis: The effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board 
  yEXPERTISE (a) aEXPERTISE (b) EXPERTISE (c) mEXPERTISE (d) 
  Low ZSCORE High ZSCORE Low ZSCORE High ZSCORE Low ZSCORE High ZSCORE Low ZSCORE High ZSCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.139** -0.001       
 (-2.16) (-0.02)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -1.074** -0.115     
   (-2.55) (-0.34)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -3.469*** -0.664   
     (-3.27) (-0.79)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.425** -0.060 
       (-2.05) (-0.40) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.791 0.718 0.791 0.719 0.792 0.718 0.791 
Panel B: CSCORE_RANK and measures of banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.117* 0.021       
 (-1.86) (0.43)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -0.985** 0.004     
   (-2.40) (0.01)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -2.888*** -0.204   
     (-2.79) (-0.24)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.305 0.083 
       (-1.51) (0.56) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 1708 1720 
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.797 0.734 0.797 0.734 0.797 0.733 0.797 
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Table 10  Cross-sectional analysis: The effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board (continued) 
Panel C: NOACC_RANK and measures of banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.175 -0.075       
 (-1.58) (-0.76)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -1.555** -0.262     
   (-2.15) (-0.38)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -4.991*** -1.667   
     (-2.74) (-0.99)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.721** -0.256 
       (-2.03) (-0.85) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1693 1713 1693 1713 1693 1713 1693 1713 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.211 0.174 0.211 0.176 0.212 0.174 0.211 
This table reports the findings on the effect of bankruptcy risk on the relationship between accounting conservatism and banking expertise on the board. We define firms with 
low (high) ZSCORE as having a ZSCOREt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. In Panel A, B, and C, we use CONS_RANK, CSCORE_RANK, and NOACC_RANK 
as the dependent variable (used as substitutes), respectively. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 11  Cross-sectional analysis: the effect of financial leverage on the relationship between CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise 
  yEXPERTISE (a) aEXPERTISE (b) EXPERTISE (c) mEXPERTISE (d) 
  High leverage Low Leverage High leverage Low Leverage High leverage Low Leverage High leverage Low Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.127** 0.003       
 (-2.12) (0.08)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -0.998*** -0.323     
   (-2.58) (-0.99)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -2.884*** -1.146   
     (-2.74) (-1.57)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.314 0.016 
       (-1.53) (0.13) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.838 0.739 0.838 0.740 0.838 0.739 0.838 
Panel B: CSCORE_RANK and measures of banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.078 -0.008       
 (-1.35) (-0.17)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -0.699* -0.467     
   (-1.87) (-1.44)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -2.263** -1.377*   
     (-2.23) (-1.89)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.199 0.000 
       (-1.01) (0.00) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 1714 
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.843 0.755 0.843 0.755 0.844 0.755 0.843 
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Table 11 Cross-sectional analysis: the effect of financial leverage on the relationship between CONS_RANK and measures of banking expertise (continued) 
 
 Panel C: NOACC_RANK and measures of banking expertise on boards of directors 
yEXPERTISEi,t -0.164* -0.099       
 (-1.75) (-0.85)       
aEXPERTISEi,t   -1.096* -0.910     
   (-1.82) (-1.09)     
EXPERTISEi,t     -4.512*** -2.632   
     (-2.77) (-1.40)   
mEXPERTISEi,t       -0.705** -0.385 
       (-2.22) (-1.16) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1705 1701 1705 1701 1705 1701 1705 1701 
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.195 0.199 0.195 0.201 0.196 0.200 0.195 
This table reports the findings on the effect of financial distress on the relationship between accounting conservatism and measures of banking expertise. We define firms with 
low (high) financial leverage as having LEVt-1 lower (greater) than the median of all firms. In Panel A, B, and C, we use CONS_RANK, CSCORE_RANK, and NOACC_RANK 
as the dependent variable (used as substitutes), respectively. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Industry fixed effects are based on Datastream’s level six codes. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this research, we revisit the relationships between bankers (ex-bankers) on boards of directors and accounting 
conservatism by providing an innovative way to measure banking expertise based on the working history in banks 
of all individual directors on the board. Using a sample of listed companies in the UK from 2005 to 2012, we 
find evidence to support the view that the banking expertise on the board negatively affects accounting 
conservatism. The negative relationship is both statistically and economically significant. The findings hold 
strongly for various robustness checks. Also, further analyses show that the banking expertise on the board has a 
more pronounced impact on accounting conservatism when firms have high bankruptcy risk and when firms have 
high financial leverage. The research makes significant contributions to the literature. First, the measure of 
banking expertise proposed in this study possibly results in more reliable findings on the relationship between 
bankers (ex-bankers) and accounting conservatism than previous studies, e.g. the work of Erkens et al. (2014) 
and Bonetti et al. (2017). Second, the study adds the research strand on the importance of life-time working 
experience of directors for corporate outcomes (e.g., Chemmanur et al. 2019; Drobetz et al. 2018). Nevertheless, 
a limitation of our study is that since the paper exclusively deals with UK data, the results might not provide 
direct evidence of the influence of the banking expertise on accounting conservatism in all international contexts. 
 
References 
Ahmed AS, Billings BK, Morton RM, Stanford-Harris M (2002) The Role of Accounting Conservatism in 
Mitigating Bondholder-Shareholder Conflicts over Dividend Policy and in Reducing Debt Costs. Acc 
Rev 77(4):867-890. 
Ahmed AS, Duellman S (2007) Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics: An Empirical 
Analysis. J Acc Econ 43(2–3):411-437. 
Ahmed AS, Duellman S (2013) Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism. J Acc Res 51(1):1-
30. 
Altman EI (1968) Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. J Finance 
23(4):589-609. 
Ball R, Kothari SP, Nikolaev VV (2013a) On Estimating Conditional Conservatism. Acc Rev 88(3):755-787. 
Ball R, Shivakumar L (2005) Earnings Quality in UK Private Firms: Comparative Loss Recognition Timeliness. 
J Acc Econ 39(1):83-128. 
Ball R, Shivakumar L (2008) Earnings Quality at Initial Public Offerings. J Acc Econ 45(2-3):324-349. 
Ball RAY, Kothari SP, Nikolaev VV (2013b) Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric Timeliness Coefficient and 
Accounting Conservatism. J Acc Res 51(5):1071-1097. 
Bank of England (2016). List of Banks.   Retrieved 29th April, 2017, from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/authorisations/banklist/bankslist1601.pdf 
Banker RD, Basu S, Byzalov D, Chen JYS (2012) Direction of Sales Change and Asymmetric Timeliness of 
Earnings. Working paper, Temple University.  
Basu S (1997) The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings. J Acc Econ 24(1):3-37. 
Beatty A, Petacchi R, Zhang H (2012) Hedge Commitments and Agency Costs of Debt: Evidence from Interest 
Rate Protection Covenants and Accounting Conservatism. Rev Acc Stud 17(3):700-738. 
Beneish MD, Press E (1993) Costs of Technical Violation of Accounting-Based Debt Covenants. Acc Rev 
68(2):233-257. 
32 
 
Bhaskar LS, Krishnan GV, Yu W (2017) Debt Covenant Violations, Firm Financial Distress, and Auditor 
Actions. Contemp Acc Res 34(1):186-215. 
Bonetti P, Ipino E, Parbonetti A (2017) The Role of Unaffiliated Bankers on Conditional Conservatism: Evidence 
from IFRS Information Shock. J Bus Finance & Acc 44(7-8):925-952. 
Burak Güner A, Malmendier U, Tate G (2008) Financial Expertise of Directors. J Finan Econ 88(2):323-354. 
Byrd DT, Mizruchi MS (2005) Bankers on the Board and the Debt Ratio of Firms. J Corp Finan 11(1-2):129-
173. 
Caskey J, Laux V (2017) Corporate Governance, Accounting Conservatism, and Manipulation. Manag Sci 
63(2):424-437. 
Caskey JA, Peterson K (2014) Conservatism Measures that Control for the Effects of Economic Rents on Stock 
Returns. Rev Quant Finance Acc 42(4):731-756. 
Chava S, Roberts MR (2008) How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants. J Finance 
63(5):2085-2121. 
Chemmanur TJ, Ertugrul M, Krishnan K (2019) Is It the Investment Bank or the Investment Banker? A Study of 
the Role of Investment Banker Human Capital in Acquisitions. J Finan Quant Anal 54(2):587-627. 
Chen H-H (2008) The Timescale Effects of Corporate Governance Measure on Predicting Financial Distress. 
Rev of Pac Basin Financ Mar and Polic 11(01):35-46. 
Chou T-K, Feng H-L (2018) Multiple Directorships and the Value of Cash Holdings. Rev Quant Finance Acc. 
Dass N, Kini O, Nanda V, Onal B, Wang J (2014) Board Expertise: Do Directors from Related Industries Help 
Bridge the Information Gap? Rev Finan Stud 27(5):1533-1592. 
Dechow PM, Kothari SP, L. Watts R (1998) The Relation between Earnings and Cash Flows. J Acc Econ 
25(2):133-168. 
Denis DJ, Wang J (2014) Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control Rights. J Finan Econ 113(3):348-
367. 
Dickinson V (2011) Cash Flow Patterns as a Proxy For Firm Life Cycle. Acc Rev 86(6):1969-1994. 
Dietrich JR, Muller KA, Riedl EJ (2007) Asymmetric Timeliness Tests of Accounting Conservatism. Rev Acc 
Stud 12(1):95-124. 
Dittmann I, Maug E, Schneider C (2010) Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They 
Are Worth, and Why They Are (Still) There. Rev Finance 14(1):35-71. 
Drobetz W, von Meyerinck F, Oesch D, Schmid M (2018) Industry expert directors. J Banking Finance 92:195-
215. 
Engelberg J, Gao P, Parsons CA (2012) Friends with Money. J Finan Econ 103(1):169-188. 
Erkens DH, Subramanyam KR, Zhang J (2014) Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting. Acc 
Rev 89(5):1703-1728. 
Faleye O, Hoitash R, Hoitash U (2018) Industry Expertise on Corporate Boards. Rev Quant Finance Acc 
50(2):441-479. 
Fich EM, Slezak SL (2008) Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from Bankruptcy? An Empirical 
Analysis. Rev Quant Finance Acc 30(2):225-251. 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2012). UK Corporate Governance Code   Retrieved from 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-
Code-September-2012.aspx  
Gao Y, Khan M, Tan L (2017) Further Evidence on Consequences of Debt Covenant Violations. Contemp Acc 
Res 34(3):1489-1521. 
García Lara JM, García Osma B, Penalva F (2009a) Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Governance. Rev 
Acc Stud 14(1):161-201. 
García Lara JM, García Osma B, Penalva F (2009b) The Economic Determinants of Conditional Conservatism. 
J Bus Finance & Acc 36(3/4):336-372. 
33 
 
García Lara JM, García Osma B, Penalva F (2011) Conditional Conservatism and Cost of Capital. Rev Acc Stud 
16(2):247-271. 
García Lara JM, García Osma B, Penalva F (2016) Accounting Conservatism and Firm Investment Efficiency. J 
Acc Econ 61(1):221-238. 
Gigler F, Kanodia C, Sapra H, Venugopalan R (2009) Accounting Conservatism and the Efficiency of Debt 
Contracts. J Acc Res 47(3):767-797. 
Givoly D, Hayn C (2000) The Changing Time-series Properties of Earnings, Cash Flows and Accruals: Has 
Financial Reporting Become More Conservative? J Acc Econ 29(3):287-320. 
Givoly D, Hayn CK, Natarajan A (2007) Measuring Reporting Conservatism. Acc Rev 82(1):65-106. 
Goh BW, Lim CY, Lobo GJ, Tong YH (2017) Conditional Conservatism and Debt versus Equity Financing. 
Contemp Acc Res 34(1):216-251. 
Goh L, Gupta A (2016) Remuneration of Non-executive Directors: Evidence from the UK. Brit Acc Rev 
48(3):379-399. 
Gow ID, Larcker DF, Reiss PC (2016) Causal Inference in Accounting Research. J Acc Res 54(2):477-523. 
Heflin F, Hsu C, Jin Q (2014) Accounting Conservatism and Street Earnings. Rev Acc Stud 20(2):674-709. 
Hilscher J, Şişli-Ciamarra E (2013) Conflicts of Interest on Corporate Boards: The effect of Creditor-directors 
on Acquisitions. J Corp Finan 19:140-158. 
Hu C, Jiang W (2019) Managerial Risk Incentives and Accounting Conservatism. Rev Quant Finance Acc 
52(3):781-813. 
Huang Q, Jiang F, Lie E, Yang K (2014) The Role of Investment Banker Directors in M&A. J Finan Econ 
112(2):269-286. 
Jain A, Jain C, Robin A (2019) Does Accounting Conservatism Deter Short Sellers? Rev Quant Finance Acc. 
Kang MJ, Kim A (2017) Bankers on the Board and CEO Incentives. Europ Finan Manage 23(2):292-324. 
Khan M, Watts RL (2009) Estimation and Empirical Properties of a Firm-year Measure of Accounting 
Conservatism. J Acc Econ 48(2–3):132-150. 
Kim J-B, Zhang L (2016) Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-level Evidence. Contemp 
Acc Res 33(1):412-441. 
Kim Y, Li S, Pan C, Zuo L (2013) The Role of Accounting Conservatism in the Equity Market: Evidence from 
Seasoned Equity Offerings. Acc Rev 88(4):1327-1356. 
Kong X, Radhakrishnan S, Tsang A (2017) Corporate Lobbying, Visibility and Accounting Conservatism. J Bus 
Finance & Acc 44(5-6):527-557. 
Kracaw WA, Zenner M (1998) Bankers in the Boardroom: Good News or Bad News. Smeal College of Business 
Administration, Pennsylvania State University.  
Kravet TD (2014) Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Risk-Taking: Corporate Acquisitions. J Acc Econ 
57(2-3):218-240. 
Kroszner RS, Strahan PE (2001) Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability. J 
Finan Econ 62(3):415-452. 
Lafond R, Roychowdhury S (2008) Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. J Acc Res 46(1):101-
135. 
LaFond R, Watts RL (2008) The Information Role of Conservatism. Acc Rev 83(2):447-478. 
Larcker DF, Richardson SA, Tuna I (2007) Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational 
Performance. Acc Rev 82(4):963-1008. 
Lennox CS, Francis JR, Wang Z (2012) Selection Models in Accounting Research. Acc Rev 87(2):589-616. 
Li J (2013) Accounting Conservatism and Debt Contracts: Efficient Liquidation and Covenant Renegotiation. 
Contemp Acc Res 30(3):1082-1098. 
Lin L (2014) Institutional Ownership Composition and Accounting Conservatism. Rev Quant Finance Acc 
46(2):359-385. 
3 4 
 
Li u M, M a g n a n M ( 2 0 1 6) C o n diti o n al C o ns er v atis m a n d t h e Yi el d S pr e a d of C or p or at e B o n d I ss u es. R e v Q u a nt 
Fi n a n c e A c c 4 6( 4): 8 4 7- 8 7 9. 
L o b o GJ, R o bi n A, W u K ( 2 0 1 9) S h ar e R e p ur c h as e s a n d A c c o u nti n g C o n s er v atis m. R e v Q u a nt Fi n a n c e A c c. 
L o ui s H, S u n A X, Ur c a n O ( 2 0 1 2) V al u e of C a s h H ol di n g s a n d A c c o u nti n g C o n s er v atis m. C o nt e m p A c c R es 
2 9( 4): 1 2 4 9- 1 2 7 1. 
M or a A, W al k er M ( 2 0 1 5) T h e I m pli c ati o ns of R es e ar c h o n A c c o u nti n g C o n s er v ati s m f or A c c o u nti n g St a n d ar d 
S etti n g. A c c B u s R es 4 5( 5): 6 2 0- 6 5 0. 
N as h R C, N ett er J M, P o uls e n A B ( 2 0 0 3) D et er mi n a nts of C o ntr a ct u al R el ati o ns b et w e e n S h ar e h ol d er s a n d 
B o n d h ol d er s: I n v est m e nt O p p ort u niti e s a n d R e stri cti v e C o v e n a nt s. J C or p Fi n a n 9( 2): 2 0 1- 2 3 2. 
Ni k ol a e v V V ( 2 0 1 0) D e bt C o v e n a nt s a n d A c c o u nti n g C o n s er v atis m. J A c c R e s 4 8( 1): 5 1- 8 9. 
Ni ni G, S mit h D C, S ufi A ( 2 0 1 2) Cr e dit or C o ntr ol Ri g hts, C or p or at e G o v er n a n c e, a n d Fir m V al u e. R e v Fi n a n 
St u d 2 5( 6): 1 7 1 3- 1 7 6 1. 
O pl er T C, Tit m a n S ( 1 9 9 4) Fi n a n ci al Distr e ss a n d C or p or at e P erf or m a n c e. J Fi n a n c e 4 9( 3): 1 0 1 5- 1 0 4 0. 
P a e J, T h or nt o n D B, W el k er M ( 2 0 0 5) T h e Li n k b et w e e n E ar ni n gs C o n s er v ati s m a n d t h e Pri c e-t o- B o o k R ati o. 
C o nt e m p A c c R es 2 2( 3): 6 9 3- 7 1 7. 
R aj a n R G ( 1 9 9 2) I nsi d er s a n d O utsi d er s: T h e C h oi c e b et w e e n I nf or m e d a n d Ar m's ‐ l e n gt h D e bt. J Fi n a n c e 
4 7( 4): 1 3 6 7- 1 4 0 0. 
R o y c h o w d h ur y S, W atts R L ( 2 0 0 7) As y m m etri c Ti m eli n ess of E ar ni n gs, M ar k et-t o- B o o k a n d C o ns er v atis m i n 
Fi n a n ci al R e p orti n g. J A c c E c o n 4 4( 1- 2): 2- 3 1. 
R u c h G W, T a yl or G ( 2 0 1 5) A c c o u nti n g C o n s er v atis m: A R e vi e w of t h e Lit er at ur e. J A c c Lit er 3 4: 1 7- 3 8. 
S hi p m a n J E, S w a n q uist Q T, W hit e d R L ( 2 0 1 7) Pr o p e nsit y S c or e M at c hi n g i n A c c o u nti n g R e s e ar c h. A c c R e v 
9 2( 1): 2 1 3- 2 4 4. 
Sti glit z J E, W eiss A ( 1 9 8 1) Cr e dit R ati o ni n g i n M ar k ets wit h I m p erf e ct I nf or m ati o n. A m er E c o n R e v 7 1( 3): 3 9 3-
4 1 0. 
T affl er RJ ( 1 9 8 3) T h e Ass es s m e nt of C o m p a n y S ol v e n c y a n d P erf or m a n c e Usi n g a St ati sti c al M o d el. A c c B us 
R es 1 3( 5 2): 2 9 5- 3 0 8. 
W a n g C, Xi e F, Z h u M ( 2 0 1 5) I n d ustr y E x p ertis e of I n d e p e n d e nt Dir e ct or s a n d B o ar d M o nit ori n g. J Fi n a n Q u a nt 
A n al 5 0( 5): 9 2 9- 9 6 2. 
W atts R L ( 2 0 0 3) C o ns er v atis m i n A c c o u nti n g P art I: E x pl a n ati o n s a n d I m pli c ati o ns. A c c H ori z 1 7( 3): 2 0 7- 2 2 1. 
Z h a n g J ( 2 0 0 8) T h e C o ntr a cti n g B e n efits of A c c o u nti n g C o ns er v atis m t o L e n d er s a n d B orr o w er s. J A c c E c o n 
4 5( 1): 2 7- 5 4. 
 
  
35 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions 
Accounting conservatism measures 
CONS_RANK Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of total accounting conservatism 
(García Lara et al. 2016), where total accounting conservatism is the sum of the 
timeliness of good news (GSCORE) and the asymmetric timeliness of bad news over 
good news (CSCORE) estimated by the model of Khan and Watts (2009), which is based 
on Basu (1997). We calculate the average of total accounting conservatism across years 
t-2, t-1, and t (denoted 
	,); then rank 
	, of all firms for each year; and 
divide the rank values by N+1, where N is the total observations in each rank group. We 
refer to the new variable as the annual fractional rank of total accounting conservatism. 
CSCORE_RANK Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of CSCORE (Basu 1997; Khan and 
Watts 2009). 
NOACC_RANK Annual fractional rank of the three-year average of the negative accumulation of non-
operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000). The calculation of negative non-operating 
accruals is as follows: 
, = −1 ∗ F$, 	− 	,G 
	= 	−1 ∗ FH+, 	+ 	,, −	6,I
− H∆, 	+ 	J	&, 	+ J	, − 	J	5, − 	J	,IG	 
Where: , is negative non-operating accruals at the end of year t; $, is total 
accruals before depreciation and amortisation at the end of year t; , is operating 
accruals at the end of year t; , is net income in year t; , is depreciation and 
amortisation in year t; 6, is cash flows from operations in year t; ∆, is change 
in account receivables from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t; J	&, is change in 
inventories from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t; J	, is change in 
prepaid expenses from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t; J	5, is change in 
account payables from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t; J	, is change in tax 
payables from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t. All variables are scaled by total 
assets at the end of year t. i represents company i and t represents fiscal year t. 
Banking expertise measures 
yEXPERTISE Total number of years all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks. 
aEXPERTISE Total number of banks for which all directors on the board have worked as executives. 
EXPERTISE The presence of banking expertise on the board, which is equal one if a company has at 
least one director on board who has worked as an executive in a bank, zero otherwise. 
mEXPERTISE Average number of years all directors on the board have worked as executives in banks, 
which is equal yEXPERTISE divided by the number of board members. 
Other variables 
∆	% Sale growth, which is equal change in sales from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total assets 
at the end of year t. 
ACC Accruals which are calculated as follows:  = ∆& +	∆ + ∆ − ∆5 −
∆% − , where ∆& is change in inventories from the end of year t-1 to year the 
end of year t, ∆ is change in receivables from the end of year t-1 to year the end of 
year t, ∆ is change in other current assets from the end of year t-1 to year the end of 
year t, ∆5 is change in payables from the end of year t-1 to year the end of year t, 
∆% is change in other current liabilities the end of year t-1 to year the end of year t, 
 is depreciation and amortisation in year t. 
AT Total assets 
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CASH Ratio of cash to total asset at the end of year t. 
CFO Cash flow from operations, which equals to net income before extraordinary items ($) 
minus accruals () in year t, scaled by assets at the end of year t. 
CYCLE Business life cycle (Dickinson 2011), which is a dummy variable is equal one if firms 
are classified based on cash flows as at mature stage (positive cash flows from operating 
activities, negative cash flows from investing activities, and negative cash flows from 
financing activities), and zero if firms are classified as at young stage (negative cash 
flows from operating activities, negative cash flows from investing activities, and 
positive cash flows from financing activities), or growth stage (positive cash flows from 
operating activities, negative cash flows from investing activities, and positive cash 
flows from financing activities). 
D A dummy variable that equals one if  < 0, and zero otherwise. 
DCFO A dummy variable which equals to one if 6 < 0, and zero otherwise. 
DEBTISSUE Debt issue, which is a dummy variable with the value of one if the change in short-term 
and long-term debts from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t. 
EARN Net income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by market value of equity at the 
end of year t-1 
IB Net income before extraordinary items 
LEV Financial leverage, which is the sum of long-term and short-term debts at the end of year 
t, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t. 
MTB Market to book ratio, which is equal to market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity at the end of year t. 
PPE Ratio of property plant and equipment (gross) to total assets at the end of year t. 
RET Buy-and-hold stock returns for the period from the beginning to the end of fiscal year t 
SALE Sales 
SEO Equity issue, which is a dummy variable with the value of one if a firm increases 
outstanding shares in year t at least 5% with positive proceeds from equity issuance, zero 
otherwise. 
SIZE Firm size, which is the log of the market value of equity at the end of year t 
ZSCORE Financial distress at the end of year t, measured by !	 following (Taffler 1983) as 
follows: 
ZSCORE = 3.2 + 	12.18 ∗
Profit	before	tax
current	liabilities
	+ 	2.50 ∗
Current	assets
Total	liabilities
	− 	10.68
∗
Current	liabilities
Total	assets
	+ 	0.029
∗
(Quick	assets − Current	liabilities)
(Sales − Pretax	income − Depreciation)/365
 
 
